Under the dictatorship of President Omar al-Bashir from 1989 to 2019 Sudan saw its resources plundered as corruption became widespread, and an increasing amounts of the national budget, over two-thirds, was devoted to the military and security services. From using rebels such as the Janjaweed to do his bidding in Western Sudan whilst the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) fought in the Second Sudanese Civil War, Bashir purchased the loyalty of local militias who would become the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Bashir’s own private army, a means of coup-proofing himself from any aspirational generals in the SAF.

With control of both the SAF and the RSF, Bashir seemed set to be ruler for life until the pro-democracy protests and revolution in 2019 brought an end to his 40-year reign. However, since 2019, Sudan has entered a new quagmire as the protectors of Bashir, who turned on their patron, now fight one another for control of Sudan.

Following the removal of Bashir, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) placed the heads of both the SAF and RSF, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), in leadership positions for transitional Sudan. They agreed to the Constitutional Declaration with civilian opposition groups, outlining a 39-month transition period, with the military overseeing the first 21 months and civilian groups the remaining 18 months. However, after the military period ended, Burhan and Hemedti refused to relinquish power. Burhan orchestrated a coup d’état in October 2021, arresting Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and other senior government figures.

In July 2022, following further pro-democracy protests that saw the SAF clamp down on protestors, resulting in 117 deaths, Burhan announced that the army would withdraw, allowing political and revolutionary groups to form a transitional civilian government. Burhan also announced intentions for “free, fair, and transparent elections at their scheduled time” in July 2023.

Despite signs that Sudanese victory over Bashir and his dictatorship was not yet lost, the key question remained: how would the SAF, which has been the key actor in Sudanese politics since independence in 1956, move aside and remain out of politics? Moreover, what would become of the RSF, which without Bashir, has no functional purpose but controls huge territories such as Darfur, monopolizes the Sudanese gold trade, and commands over 100,000 hired soldiers?

Plans to merge the RSF into the SAF led to inevitable clashes between Burhan and Hemedti as the two strongmen realized there was space for only one of them.  It was proposed that the RSF would merge into the SAF, Burhan suggested within two years, whilst Hemedti, who has become something of an unaccountable warlord acting on behalf of Bashir across the region demanded ten.

Consequently, on April 15, 2023, civil war broke out between the SAF and RSF as two leaders, who have both found themselves enriched and empowered by their positions, refused to step aside. Since April 2023, the Sudanese government has effectively ceased functioning due to the fighting, which has reached every corner of the country, including the capital, Khartoum. The Presidential Palace and Khartoum International Airport have been bombed.

In the absence of a functioning government, grassroots Sudanese activists have organized to form Resistance Committees. Over the past year, they have been instrumental in organizing logistic support for medical services and aid, and have coordinated the creation of committees for doctors, nurses, and engineers to save lives, evacuate civilians, and move resources to desperately needed locations.

Beyond organizing on the ground, Resistance Committees have put together plans to solve the crisis in Sudan, relying on a bottom-up approach utilizing political pressure and popular organizing. For many, the failed attempts to get either Burhan or Hemedti to stand down highlight the futile attempts to return to the negotiating table. Planned ceasefire talks in Jeddah, mediated by Saudi Arabia and the United States, have been canceled, and the ‘Taqaddum’ efforts organized by former Prime Minister Hamdok have yet to yield any change.

For the Resistance Committees, made up of Sudanese revolutionaries and members of civic society who toppled Omar al-Bashir, a worst-case scenario would be one that allows the militarized-commercial power of either Burhan or Hemedti to remain a significant force in Sudan. Their slogan emphasizes this in the “Three No’s” – no negotiations, no partnership, no legitimization of the military in government.

Resistance Committees have begun working on how they can remove the military from government once the fighting ends. A leading resistance committee member told Middle East Eye they were working with retired and dismissed officers to “formulate the creation of a professional army that accords with the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration”.

Unfortunately for the Resistance Committees, the SAF and RSF appear to be so evenly balanced, in part due to Bashir’s planning, that neither can land the knockout blow that will end the fighting. As such, the civil war in Sudan has become a war of attrition, compared by many to the Russian bombing of Mariupol, where utter destruction is justified only for the victor to rule over the ashes.

Such ‘total war’ has intensified in recent weeks as satellite imagery indicates that fire has been used as a weapon of war by combatants, with nearly one hundred villages razed to the ground, permanently displacing tens of thousands of civilians. Sudan Witness, an open-source project run by the nonprofit Center for Information Resilience, reported that April 2024 was the worst month in terms of the number of fires recorded and settlements affected since the war began.

While credible accusations of war crimes have been made against both the SAF and RSF, the RSF has been deemed most likely responsible for the increase in fires due to their control of Darfur in the West of Sudan. Sudan Witness estimated that 31 settlements were affected by fires in April when the RSF mounted an offensive on el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur.

Despite neither the SAF nor the RSF being able to subdue the other, the role of regional and global powers in the continuation of the conflict cannot be dismissed or underestimated. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as the RSF’s most obvious patron, with the United Nations finding that the UAE has been supplying weapons to Sudan via Chad, disguised as humanitarian aid. Similarly, the gold mined in regions controlled by the RSF, owned in large part by Hemedti, has found a liquid market in the UAE, which the Russians have used following the global sanctions placed on them, explaining why Wagner forces are supporting the RSF with anti-aircraft systems.

To the North-West, the RSF also has support from Khalifa Haftar in Libya, seemingly at the direction of the UAE, who has permitted huge amounts of gas to cross the country’s borders to fuel RSF vehicles. Given the conflict in Sudan has been described as relying on 4×4’s, many argue the quickest way to end the conflict would be to stop Libyan petroleum crossing the border. The SAF has also found itself with a range of international backers, including Iran, who, to balance the influence of the UAE and ‘Sunni Islam’ in the region, have supplied Burhan’s forces with the Mohajer-4 and Mohajer-6 drones.

However, most concerning of all is the double dealing that has taken place behind the scenes where other countries, seemingly less involved, are funding both the SAF and RSF to maintain some influence or favor in Sudan and the region when a potential victor emerges. To some extent, this began under the reign of Bashir who allowed Burhan and Hemedti to become deeply involved in regional affairs which has enabled both to have a network of allies who continue to fund and support them.

The continued funding of both sides, directly and indirectly, by regional and global powers has all but ensured Sudan is on course for a Third Sudanese Civil War, one that could be destined to be as long as the previous two, and whose ramifications will make the collapse of Libya look negligible. While Omar al-Bashir’s patronage of the RSF may have been a stroke of genius to ensure his political survival for decades, it continues to cast a shadow over Sudan years after his departure. But the continuation of equivalent patronage by foreign powers has made the war between the SAF and RSF become the living embodiment of “an immovable object meeting an unstoppable force.”